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Abstract
Previous research finds that customer racial discrimination decreases the price of
a non-white baseball player’s card but does not decrease the price of a non-white
basketball player’s card. This paper seeks to examine if racial minority or league minority
affects the value of a trading card. Using disaggregated player performance data from
1977 we explore this question with baseball cards (in which non-white players are the
league minority) and basketball cards (in which white non-players are the league
majority). Using Tobit regressions, we find that customer discrimination exists against
non-white players in both baseball and basketball leagues.
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I. Introduction
In an attempt to identify the roots of economic inequality in American society,
many economists have turned their attention to racial discrimination. Becker (1971)
defines discrimination in the market place as “voluntary relinquishing of profits, wages,
or income in order to cater to prejudice.” He cites three sources of discrimination:
employers, co-workers, and consumers. According to Arrow (1972), natural economic
forces within a competitive market reduce, if not eliminate, employer and co-worker
discrimination.

Employer discrimination forces employees seeking fair business

practices to relocate while co-worker discrimination causes self-sorting among workers in
a mobile economic environment. Therefore, if an economic imbalance exists between
races, it comes as a consequence of consumer discrimination. However, the task of
measuring consumer discrimination is not a simple one. The lack of a means to quantify
and measure a worker’s ability in most labor markets presents a formidable obstacle to
economists. The professional sports labor market is a crucial exception to this standard.
Unlike other labor markets, where employee productivity is often blurred by
extraneous variables, the professional sports labor market provides an isolated working
arena in which uninhibited competition can take place.

Thus, every worker’s

performance is a measure of individual ability, rather than a combination of skills and
externalities.1 Such a distinction is necessary when analyzing consumer discrimination.
Take, for example, the case of two competing door-to-door salesmen.

Both sales

representatives are selling the same product, at the same exact price, in the same local
area, at the same time. The only difference between the two salesmen is their race. After
1

Here the term “externalities” is taken to mean any factor, which may affect the productivity of a worker,
including job experience, age, sex, and education, among others.
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a given period of time, one salesman sells more items than the other one. Is this because
one sales representative has more experience than the other?

Is this because one

salesman is a better speaker than the other? Or, is one of the salesmen getting more sales
because the consumer is racially discriminating against the other?

None of these

questions can be answered in a market open to externalities. However, in a relatively
confined market, such as the sports labor market, consumer discrimination is identifiable
because all extraneous factors can be controlled.
Professional sport trading cards, in particular, provide an ideal means of tracing
consumer discrimination. The price of each card is derived from the entertainment value
of the player represented on the card. Accordingly, the better a player’s ability, the more
entertainment they bring to the fans that in turn pay more for their card. Each player’s
ability is quantified in the form of disaggregated statistics, which appear on the back of
each card. By analyzing the relative price a card sells for in the secondary market with
respect to a player’s race, one can show whether the price a consumer is willing to pay
for a card is affected by the player’s race.
This paper extends previous works but examines whether or not league status,
more so than race, is the underlying variable influencing the price of a trading card. This
paper seeks to answer whether card value is affected by the race of the player, or whether
it is an issue of league minority. This paper uses two Tobit regression models: one for
Major League Baseball (MLB), where non-white players are the league minority, and one
for the National Basketball Association (NBA), where non-white players are the league
majority. Therefore, the NBA provides a counterexample to the commonly studied MLB
model, which may attribute lower minority prices to non-white players rather than league
3
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minority. The results of the regression models show that race impacts the trading price
rather than league minority. That is, in both the MLB and the NBA non-white players’
cards have significantly lower prices.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the literature on the subject.
Section III describes the data and methods. Section IV describes the specifications of the
model. Section V presents the results. Section VI draws conclusions.
II. Literature
Previous research concerning consumer racial discrimination in the professional
baseball memorabilia market has suggested that a player’s race affects the value of their
trading card. Nardinelli and Simon (1990) construct a model using the 1970 Topps
Baseball Card Series as their dataset for players.

Using player statistics from the

Macmillan Baseball Encyclopedia and using Beckett’s Official 1989 Price Guide to
Baseball Cards, they determine card value. The results indicate that customer racial
discrimination decreases a nonwhite baseball player’s card value by approximately ten
percent with respect to a comparable white player’s card.
Anderson and La Croix (1991) extend Nardinelli and Simon by examining
baseball card data from 1977, rather than 1970 because the 1977 data has no supply
differences in the amount of baseball cards produced per player. That is, each player has
the same number of cards printed in that year.

Additionally, rather than use

disaggregated player performance data for hitters, Anderson and La Croix employ player
performance indices. For hitters (non-pitchers) the performance index is measured as
offensive average, which takes into account power, base hit frequency, and the effects of
walks and stolen bases. A pitcher’s performance index is based on two factors: earned
4
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run average (ERA) and the ratio of strikeouts to walks, both of which are independent of
a player’s team performance. The results of Anderson and La Croix’s paper reinforce the
conclusion of Nardinelli and Simon: customer discrimination exists against black hitters
and pitchers.
Gabriel, Johnson, and Stanton (1995) investigate customer racial discrimination
using rookie baseball cards for players entering major league baseball from 1984 to 1990.
They examine if price is explained by expected future performance, as well as past
performance and race. They find that price differences are not significantly influenced by
race, contrasting the results found by Nardinelli and Simon (1990) and Andersen and La
Croix (1991). Several factors may explain the difference in their results from those in
previous studies. By using cards from active rookie players, racial discrimination may
exist in both the current value of the card and the expectations about the future
performance of a player. In addition, market segmentation in the baseball card market
may occur such that those purchasing from the retired player’s baseball card market
(middle-aged white males) may have different racial preferences than those purchasing
from the current card market (younger adults and children).
Brown and Jewell (1994) examine customer discrimination in college basketball.
They find that customer discrimination affects the revenue-earning potential of white
players relative to black players. Therefore, they conclude that college programs wish to
discriminate against black recruits. Customer racial discrimination has also been explored
in the basketball market through Trading Cards and Neilson Ratings. Using active players
during the 1976-1977 season Stone and Warren (1999) use maximum-likelihood
estimation to explore price discrimination in basketball trading cards taking into
5
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consideration position, years, and race. Overall they find no evidence of customer
discrimination against black players. Using Neilson ratings, Kanazawa and Funk (2001)
find that viewership increases when a higher percentage of white players are playing in a
professional basketball game. Thus, explaining the salary gap in basketball as racebased.
III. Data and Methods
This paper extends the model of Nardinelli and Simon (1990) by using
disaggregated player performance data. Furthermore, the same set of data as Anderson
and La Croix (1991), 1977 Topps baseball cards, is used because of the uniform supply
of cards.

The paper differs from Stone and Warren (1999) in that only basketball cards

issued in 1977 are used and that performance statistics are included in the regression
models. The inclusion of both baseball and basketball cards allows determinations of
whether racial minority or league minority determine card value, based on the fact that
non-white players are a minority in baseball and white players are a minority in
basketball.
Beckett’s Price Guide determines the price data and RealLegends.com determines
data on race.2 In addition, each player’s career statistics are gathered from various
sources, including the CNN/Sports Illustrated archives and a downloadable sports
database program.
Each year, when a new set of cards is released, professional sport card
manufacturers insert unique groups of cards known as “subsets.” These cards differ from
the others in their appearance, their title, and the fact that they can depict multiple players
2

RealLegends.com is an online website dedicated to tracking the market for professional sports
memorabilia. The site houses complete checklists of all professional sport card sets and pictures of each
individual card.
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on one card. Every card manufacturer prints its own type of subset. In 1990, for
example, Topps inserted a subset entitled “Record Breakers” while Fleer and Donruss
included “Players of the Decade” and “Diamond Kings,” respectively. Although these
cards are considered part of the complete set, they present a problem when trying to
collect a uniform dataset because they repeat players who already appear in the main set
of cards.
The data include the 1977 set of Topps baseball cards, a total of 660 different
cards. Of these, 314 cards are omitted. The majority of these cards fall into various
subsets, including “Turn Back the Clock”, “League Leaders”, and “Big League
Brothers”. Team, coach, and manager cards are also left out along with the five checklist
cards and the two world-series cards. Likewise, for the 1977 set of Topps basketball
cards, 11 cards are omitted from the 144 card set. The omitted cards fall into the “AllStar” subset and the one checklist card.
With the remaining data, histograms are used to gain a better understanding of the
price distribution of each card set with respect to a player’s race. Figures 1 and 2 show
the percentage of cards for white and non-white baseball non-pitchers and pitchers in
specified price bins, while Figure 3 shows similar information for basketball players.
Figures 1 – 3 show that in both sports, non-white players represent a substantial portion
of the higher price cards. This is important because it suggests that any one card does not
bias the results in favor of one race. Therefore, any conclusions reached as to the effect
of race are a result of comparing cards of similar value.3

3

The Tobit regression results are robust when price outliers are omitted.
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To analyze the effect race and league percentage have on card value, Tobit
regressions are run on the two different sports cards. For each set of cards there is a
common card price representing the minimum observed value in the sample. This leads to
the idea of a “common player” price. As described by Nardinelli and Simon (1991), the
price of a common player’s card is the absolute minimum value a card can take and is
completely unrelated to the player performance. As illustrated in Tables 1 - 3, the
descriptive statistic tables for baseball non-pitchers, baseball pitchers, and basketball
players, respectively, the common player price for 1977 Topps baseball cards (both nonpitchers and pitchers) is $0.30 while the minimum value for a 1977 Topps basketball card
is $1.75. Several reasons exist for the variation between the baseball and basketball card
minimum values. First, there are fewer cards in the 1977 basketball set, 144 cards
compared to 660. Furthermore, Topps began making baseball cards in 1952, but did not
start making basketball cards until the 1957 - 1958 basketball season. As a result,
basketball cards are harder to come by than baseball cards for this time period.
Therefore, Tobit regressions are used to generate unbiased regression estimates.
For both leagues (MLB and the NBA), the price of the card is the dependent variable,
while performance statistics and race serve as independent variables. The independent
variable for non-white player is assigned a value of 1 for non-white players (black and
Latino players) and a 0 for white players.
IV. Regression Equations and Hypotheses
A. Baseball Non-Pitchers
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for baseball non-pitchers.

As

illustrated, non-white players only account for 33.5% of the total number of hitters. The
8
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average prices for non-pitcher baseball cards are $0.84 for white players and $0.89 for
non-white players. We specified the following model for non-pitchers:

Pnon − pitchers

(?)
(+)
= β 0 + β 1 NON − WHITE + β 2 BAT AVERAGE
(+)
(+)
+ β 3 STOLEN BASES + β 4 OFFENSIVE AVERAGE

where

OFFENSIVE

(1)

AVERAGE

=

(Total Bases Gained onBase Hits + Walks + Stolen Bases)
, similar to Andersen and La
At Bats + Walks
Croix (1991). Expected signs on the coefficients are shown in parentheses. As long as the
race variables are uncorrelated with omitted variables that measure athletic ability, the
estimated coefficient on race will be an unbiased estimator of consumer discrimination.
Before settling on the regression model above, more traditional methods of
measuring a player’s performance were incorporated into the model, including hits,
games, at-bats, and the remaining variables listed in the descriptive statistics (Table I).
However, many of these disaggregated variables are eliminated based on their high
correlation to each other. For example, “hits” takes into account the number of doubles,
triples, and homeruns that a player gets. Additionally, the statistics “runs-batted-in” and
“runs scored” are omitted because of their close relationship to hits. The more hits a
player has, the more times they have the opportunity to score and the more teammates
they help reach home plate. Because of the complex network of correlated variables, a
new variable is sought to better account for a player’s productivity.

The variable

“offensive average” is borrowed from Anderson and La Croix (1991) who borrowed the
concept from Bennett and Flueck (1983).
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B. Baseball Pitchers
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for baseball pitchers. Once again,
non-white players are also a league minority, only making up 9.2% of all pitchers in
MLB. The average prices for pitcher baseball cards are $0.68 for white players and $0.52
for non-white players. We specified the following model for pitchers:

( +)

(?)

( +)

Ppitchers = β 0 + β 1 NON − WHITE + β 2WINS + β 3 SAVES
( −)

(?)

+ β 4 INNINGS PITCHED + β 5 HITS GIVEN UP
( −)

(2)

( +)

+ β 6 RUNS GIVENUP + β 7 PITCHING RATIO
where PITCHING RATIO =

STRIKE OUTS
, similar to Andersen and La Croix (1991).
WALKS

Many of the variables excluded from this regression may provoke some controversy,
particularly earned run average, or ERA. In order to understand the reason behind its
omission, it is important to know how a pitcher’s ERA is derived.

The Official

Homepage of Major League Baseball defines ERA as “the total number of earned runs
allowed by a pitcher, divided by his total innings pitched, multiplied by nine.” The flaw
with using this variable as a means of measuring a pitcher’s performance is that there are
three distinct types of pitchers that serve three different functions: starters, relievers, and
closers. In general, a starting pitcher begins the game and pitches until he is no longer
effective in preventing the other team from getting on base and scoring. A reliever
replaces a starting pitcher if the other team is earning runs against the starter. This can
occur toward the beginning or end of the game. A closer is only used at the end of the
game as a means of ensuring that the other team does not gain any more runs.
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Accordingly, a pitcher’s ERA often reflects his role as a starter, reliever, or closer. A
starter’s ERA, for example, varies less than a closer’s ERA because of the number of
innings pitched. Because a closer pitches far less innings than a starter, any runs scored
in the last innings drastically increases a closer’s ERA. As a result, a closing pitcher
generally has a higher ERA than a starter. Likewise, the ERA of a reliever depends on
how often and when they get into the game. Therefore, instead of using ERA we use
PITCHING RATIO. Using pitching ratio in conjunction with wins, saves, innings pitched,
hits, runs, accounts for relevant statistics for each type of pitcher.
C. Basketball
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for basketball players. In contrast to
the baseball statistics, non-white players are a league majority in professional basketball.
Non-white players represent approximately 70.7% of the entire NBA. The average prices
for basketball cards are $5.72 for white players and $4.51 for non-white players. We
specified the following model for basketball players:

(?)

(+ )

(?)

Pbasketball = β 0 + β 1 NON − WHITE + β 2 REBOUNDS + β 3 PERSONAL FOULS
(+)

(+ )

(3)

+ β 4 ASSISTS + β 5 AVERAGE POINTS PER GAME
Unlike baseball, where there are two distinct aspects of the game, pitching and
hitting, basketball players must perform offensively and defensively. This allows for a
much simpler analysis of each player’s overall performance. Of the many disaggregated
variables listed in the descriptive statistics, all of them can be accounted for using
average points per game, rebounds, personal fouls, and assists. Free throws and field
goals are both explained using the “points” variable. Moreover, points and games are
11
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used to calculate average points per game. “Minutes” is also eliminated as it is highly
correlated to games. The more games a player appears in, the more minutes he has on the
court.
V. Results
A. Baseball Non-Pitchers
The baseball non-pitcher sample consists of 346 non-pitchers: 230 white players
and 116 non-white players. Equation (1) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear
and log prices, reported in Table 4. For non-pitchers, the coefficients on batting average,
stolen bases, and offensive average are all positive, as expected, and significant. More
importantly, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of –3.54 in the linear
model and –3.00 in the log model.
B. Baseball Pitchers
The baseball pitcher sample consists of 238 pitchers: 216 white players and 22
non-white players. Equation (2) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear and log
prices, reported in Table 5. Using the linear model for pitchers, the coefficients on wins,
saves, and the pitching ratio are not significant. The insignificant impact of wins and
saves on the price of a pitcher’s card is also found in Andersen and La Croix (1991)
depending on the model. However, the most surprising of these results is the pitching
ratio. In the linear model, the coefficient on innings pitched is positive and significant, as
is the coefficient on runs given up, contradicting the hypothesis. As predicted, the
coefficient on hits given up is negative and significant. More importantly in the linear
model, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of –2.95.
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Using the log model for pitchers, the coefficients on innings pitched and runs
given up are not significant. The coefficient on wins, saves, and pitching ratio are
positive and significant as expected. Also as predicted, the coefficient on hits given up is
negative and significant. More importantly in the linear model, the coefficient on nonwhite is negative with a t-ratio of –1.73.
C. Basketball
The basketball sample consists of 133 players: 39 white players and 94 non-white
players. Equation (3) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear and log prices,
reported in Table 6. In the linear model, the coefficients on rebounds, assists, and average
points per game are all positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient on personal
fouls is not significant. More importantly, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a
t-ratio of –2.17.
In the log model, the coefficients on rebounds and average points per game are
positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient on personal fouls and assists are not
significant. Again, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of -1.06.
VI. Conclusions
Racial minority has a significant impact on the value of a professional sports card.
Consumers discriminate more against racial minorities rather than league minorities.
Accordingly, this paper supports the findings of Nardinelli and Simon (1990) and
Anderson and La Croix (1991) and finds results that differ from the findings in Stone and
Warren (1999). Thus, professional sports cards depicting racial minorities sell for
significantly less than racial majorities of equal ability.
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Figures
Figure 1. Distribution of Non-Pitcher Baseball Card
Prices by Race
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Figure 2. Distribution of Pitcher Baseball Card Prices by
Race
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Figure 3. Distribution of Basketball Card Prices by Race
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Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Baseball Non-Pitchers

Variables

Observations

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Price

346

0.86

0.30

30

Non-white

346

0.34

0

1

Batting Average

346

0.26

0.18

0.33

Games

346

1310.15

42

3562

At-Bats

346

4250.82

67

14053

Runs

346

544.95

6

2165

Hits

346

1131.82

14

4256

Doubles

346

186.81

1

746

Triples

346

29.90

0

141

Homeruns

346

105.61

0

563

Runs-Batted-In

346

521.99

3

1844

Walks

346

427.99

7

1865

Strike Outs

346

598.39

9

2597

On-Base %

346

0.32

0.23

0.40

Slugging %

346

0.48

1.86

35

Stolen Bases

346

81.32

0

938

Offensive Average*

346

0.45

0.29

0.89

* Offensive Average =

Total Bases Gained on Base Hits + Walks + Stolen Bases
At Bats + Walks

18
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Baseball Pitchers

Variables

Observations

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Price

238

0.67

0.30

20

Non-white

238

0.09

0

1

ERA

238

3.75

2.83

5.85

Wins

238

84.60

1

329

Losses

238

79.88

3

292

Saves

238

30.72

0

390

Games Pitched

238

367.21

13

1071

Innings Pitched

238

1461.60

46.2

5404

Hits Given Up

238

1404.20

58

5044

Runs Given In

238

655.58

29

2337

Errors

238

581.47

28

2012

Bases-On-Balls

238

498.90

20

2795

Strike Outs (Ks)

238

862.72

20

5714

Pitching Ratio*

238

1.58

0.84

3.25

Average Against

238

0.26

0.20

0.33

* Pitching Ratio =

Strike Outs
Walks
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Basketball Players

Variables

Observations

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Price

133

5.05

1.75

60

Non-white

133

0.71

0

1

Games

133

733.69

134

1560

Minutes

133

21828.11

1493

57446

Field Goals

133

4326.74

269

15837

Free Throws

133

2195.34

71

9018

Rebounds

133

4344.88

215

17834

Assists

133

2257.69

99

6476

Personal Fouls

133

2055.80

192

4657

Points

133

10876.36

609

38387

Average PPG

133

14.00

4.2

25.1
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Table 4. Tobit Regressions for Baseball Non-Pitchers, N = 346

Variable

Linear Price
Coefficient

Log Price
Coefficient

(t-stat)

(t-stat)

Non-white

-0.76
(-3.54***)

-0.82
(-3.00***)

Batting Average

13.33
(2.80***)

35.17
(4.59***)

Stolen Bases

0.00
(3.07***)

0.00
(2.12**)

Offensive Average
6.37
(3.73***)
Constant

Log-Likelihood
Function

12.97
(5.24***)

-5.37

-16.63

(-5.04***)

(-5.89***)

-670.75

-104.52

KEY:

* = Significance level of 10% or better
** = Significance level of 5% or better
*** = Significance level of 1% or better
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Table 5. Tobit Regressions for Baseball Pitchers, N = 238
Linear Price
Coefficient

Log Price
Coefficient

(t-stat)

(t-stat)

Non-white

-0.92
(-2.95***)

-0.79
(-1.73*)

Wins

0.00
(0.25)

0.02
(1.80*)

Saves

0.00
(0.30)

0.00
(2.05**)

Innings Pitched

0.01
(7.72***)

0.00
(0.99)

Hits Given Up

-0.01
(-13.39***)

-0.00
(-3.70***)

Runs Given Up

0.01
(3.23***)

-0.00
(-0.09)

Pitching Ratio

-0.23
(-0.75)

0.50
(1.84*)

Constant

0.37
(0.87)

-2.51
(-3.76***)

Log-Likelihood
Function

-409.60

-26.47

Variable

KEY:

* = Significance level of 10% or better
** = Significance level of 5% or better
*** = Significance level of 1% or better
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Table 6. Tobit Regressions for Basketball Players, N = 133
Linear Price
Coefficient

Log Price
Coefficient

(t-stat)

(t-stat)

Non-white

-3.69
(-2.17**)

-1.06
(-2.98***)

Rebounds

0.01
(2.70***)

0.00
(1.87*)

Personal Fouls

-0.00
(-1.47)

-0.00
(-0.65)

Assists

0.00
(2.12**)

0.00
(0.42)

Average PPG

1.20
(5.90***)

0.17
(3.85***)

Constant

-15.14
(-4.61***)

-1.62
(-1.82*)

Log-Likelihood
Function

-333.60

-50.72

Variables

KEY:

* = Significance level of 10% or better
** = Significance level of 5% or better
*** = Significance level of 1% or better
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